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Abstract 
In this paper we compare the determinants of loan dollarisation in two emerging market 
regions, namely Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) and Latin America, by 
means of a meta-analysis of 32 studies that provide around 1,200 estimated coefficients 
for six drivers of foreign currency lending. One common pattern we identify is that 
macroeconomic instability (as expressed by inflation volatility) and banks’ funding in foreign 
currency play a significant role in explaining loan dollarisation in both regions. By contrast, the 
interest rate differential appears to be a key determinant only in Latin America, while  
the positive impact of exchange rate volatility on dollarisation implies a more prominent role 
for supply factors in the CESEE region. While the robustness of the results has been 
verified, our meta-analysis shows that estimates reported in the literature tend to be 
influenced by study characteristics such as the methodology applied and the data used.  
Keywords: foreign currency loans, CESEE, Latin America, meta-regression, random 
effects maximum likelihood. 
JEL Classification: C5, E52, F31, O57, P20. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
En el presente artículo se comparan los determinantes de la dolarización de los préstamos 
bancarios en dos regiones, América Latina y Europa Central y Oriental, con una metodología 
de metaanálisis a partir de 32 estudios previos sobre el tema, que proporcionan unos 1.200 
coeficientes estimados para las 6 principales variables macroeconómicas que influyen sobre 
la aparición de préstamos en moneda extranjera en las economías. Ambas regiones 
presentan patrones comunes (la estabilidad macroeconómica y la financiación de los bancos 
en moneda extranjera juegan un papel relevante a la hora de explicar la dolarización de los 
préstamos), pero también claras diferencias, como el hecho de que el diferencial de tipos de 
interés sea una variable determinante tan solo en América Latina, mientras que en Europa 
Central y Oriental tenga mayor influencia la volatilidad del tipo de cambio. Estas diferencias 
apuntarían a una mayor prominencia de los factores de demanda en el caso de América 
Latina, y de oferta en Europa del Este, a la hora de determinar la concesión de un préstamo 
en moneda extranjera.  
Palabras clave: préstamos en moneda extranjera, América Latina, Europa del Este, meta-
análisis. 
Códigos JEL: C5, E52, F31, O57, P20. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s, high levels of inflation, wide interest rate spreads, local 
currency depreciation and the low credibility of domestic economic policies as well as chronic 
monetary financing of budget deficits prompted massive portfolio shifts into dollar-
denominated assets and liabilities in most Latin American countries (Galindo and Leiderman, 
2005). One decade later, a similar process resulting in a buildup of large stocks of financial 
assets and liabilities in foreign currency was observed in the European transition economies. 
While such dollarization1
The literature on dollarization has identified major determinants of foreign currency 
lending in emerging market economies, reflecting both demand- and supply-side factors and 
the interaction between them. These factors include the interest rate differential, the inflation 
rate and exchange rate depreciation; the volatility of inflation and of the exchange rate as well 
as the ratio between the two variables (the so-called minimum variance portfolio ratio – MVP 
ratio); and banks’ funding in foreign currency.
 may help reduce capital flight, curb inflation expectations and induce 
macroeconomic stabilization, it may also limit the independence of monetary policy and 
create systemic vulnerabilities in financial and nonfinancial sectors. The potential adverse 
effects of dollarization are amplified when firms and households hold unhedged liabilities, in 
particular bank loans, in foreign currency: this exacerbates credit default risk and currency 
mismatch and thus creates potential threats to financial stability. Moreover, evidence from 
emerging economies in general and from Latin America and CESEE in particular reveals that, 
unless addressed, dollarization tends to be a persistent phenomenon. Yet to be able to 
achieve dedollarization (i.e. reduce foreign currency-denominated assets) policymakers need 
to be aware of the key underlying drivers and understand above all whether dollarization was 
induced by demand- or supply-side factors (EBRD, 2010). 
2
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to first analyze the main drivers of loan 
dollarization (i.e. foreign currency lending by banks in the domestic market) in CESEE and 
Latin America, and to establish whether loan dollarization has been a supply- or a demand-
driven process. In a second step, we investigate whether and how the drivers of loan 
dollarization differ between the two regions. Such a comparison should allow us (i) to identify 
typical patterns and idiosyncratic factors characterizing dollarization; and (ii) to deduce policy 
lessons for CESEE from the way dollarization and its consequences were handled earlier in 
Latin American countries. For that purpose, we conduct a metaregression analysis to 
condense the findings of previous empirical studies and establish the “true effect size” across 
datasets (Stanley and Jarrel, 1989).  
 At the same time, empirical studies on both 
Latin America and CESEE have remained rather inconclusive and the results diverge to some 
extent depending on the countries analyzed, the time period considered or the estimation 
method used.  
Our findings suggest that loan dollarization was indeed driven by different factors in 
CESEE and Latin America. In Latin America, unlike in CESEE, the interest rate spread had a 
positive and significant impact on dollarization whereas exchange rate volatility had a negative 
impact, which would imply that Latin American dollarization was demand-driven. Hence, a 
                                                                            
1. Dollarization is the (total or partial) replacement of the domestic currency by any foreign currency as a store of value, 
unit of account or medium of exchange within the domestic economy. Dollarization frequently involves the U.S. dollar, 
which is widespread in Latin American countries, while the CESEE countries have extensively used the euro and the 
Swiss franc. In this paper we analyze the dollarization of banks' financial assets, specifically lending to the private 
nonfinancial sector by banks in the domestic market. 
2. We should underline that the literature has identified region-specific factors which might influence the degree of 
dollarization. In particular, the EU accession perspective and the euro adoption perspective of the CESEE countries have 
been shown to play a key role (e.g. Rosenberg and Tirpak, 2008). However, in our study we focus on determinants of 
foreign currency lending which are common to both regions and have a sufficient number of coefficients. 
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rise in exchange rate volatility would make foreign currency loans less attractive for borrowers. 
In CESEE in contrast, exchange rate volatility had a positive impact, making risk-averse 
lenders more willing to supply foreign currency loans in order to match their foreign currency 
positions and reduce their currency risk. In both regions, loan dollarization was, moreover, 
heavily driven by macroeconomic instability, as reflected by inflation volatility, and banks’ 
funding in foreign currency.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides descriptive evidence of 
financial dollarization, both on the assets and liabilities side in Latin America and CESEE. 
Section 2 presents a literature review of the determinants of foreign currency lending aimed at 
identifying the most common explanatory factors at the macroeconomic level. Section 3 
describes the meta-analysis framework used to estimate the “true size effect” of the drivers of 
loan dollarization. Section 4 discusses the metaregression results and checks their 
robustness. The last section concludes. 
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1 Descriptive Evidence on Financial Dollarization in Latin America and CESEE3
Although dollarization has been reduced successfully by some countries in both regions,
  
4
 
 it 
tends to be a persistent phenomenon and has indeed been rising in some economies. Yet 
there are some striking differences between the two regions. First, the degree of currency 
substitution is higher on average in CESEE than in Latin America, both on the assets and the 
liabilities side (see charts 1 and 2). 
In CESEE, 60% of private sector loans and 40% of private sector deposits were 
denominated in foreign currency in 2012, compared with only 27% and 24%, respectively, in 
Latin America. The lower dollarization levels in some countries in Latin America are, however, 
the result of policy or market intervention: In 2001, around 50% of total loans and deposits 
were denominated in U.S. dollars (or even around 70% in some countries, e.g. Peru and 
Uruguay). For instance, Argentina officially pesified (dedollarized) and indexed foreign currency 
loans and deposits after the 2001 crisis. Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Colombia imposed 
restrictions on holding foreign currency loans, introduced financial instruments indexed to 
exchange rate and inflation developments, or even implemented government policies to 
dedollarize public sector liabilities.5
                                                                            
3. In the context of this paper, the CESЕE region includes the eight CESEE EU Member States which have not yet 
adopted the euro (i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania and two 
(potential) EU candidate countries (i.e. Albania and Serbia). Latin America includes seven countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
México, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay. 
 In Latin America, both loan and deposit dollarization hence 
decreased constantly from 2000 onward and somewhat stabilized at lower levels during the 
recent crisis. In contrast, dollarization in CESEE was increasing steadily before the 2008/2009 
crisis, fueled by both the EU accession perspective and increasing external funding as well as 
demand factors (Beckmann, Scheiber and Stix, 2011). The share of foreign currency loans in 
CESEE continued to increase even after the onset of the 2008/2009 crisis in all countries but 
4. The list of success stories includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Poland (EBRD, 2010). 
5. See Gallego et al. (2010). 
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Chart 1
Source: National central banks.
Note: The data refer to loans to the private nonfinancial sector and are adjusted for exchange rate developments (using January 2008 exchange rates). Data 
for Brazil and Colombia are not available.
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the Czech Republic, Croatia and Albania. Indeed, the crisis seems to have pushed up 
dollarization in some CESEE countries. On average, loan dollarization increased by 13 
percentage points in the region as a whole between 2008 and 2012.  
Second, the degree of regional divergence differs as well. In Latin America, the share 
of foreign currency loans in total loans outstanding in 2012 ranged from 11% (in Argentina 
and Mexico) to around a 50% (in Peru and Uruguay), while the respective shares in CESEE 
ranged from 10% (the Czech Republic) to close to 90% (Latvia).6
 
 Furthermore, in CESEE, the 
share of foreign currency deposits was as high as 60% to 75% in the majority of the countries 
analyzed, with only one country (the Czech Republic) exhibiting a share clearly below 15% of 
total deposits. In contrast, in Latin America, five of the seven countries analyzed registered a 
ratio below 15%. 
Third, regarding potential drivers of loan dollarization, a major difference between the 
two regions is the degree of currency mismatch in the respective banking systems (i.e. the 
difference between the level of loans and deposits in foreign currency as a share of GDP; see 
chart 37
                                                                            
6. On January 1, 2014, Latvia became the 18th euro area member state. 
). The banking systems in CESEE as defined here tend to be dollarized more heavily 
on the assets side than on the liabilities side. The currency mismatch is high and positive, 
having evolved over time from 1% of GDP on average in the early 2000s to around 15% in 
2008, due to an extraordinary increase of foreign currency loans. From 2008 onwards 
dollarization decreased strongly as the crisis affected both foreign currency loan demand and 
supply, especially in countries like Hungary. Only in Albania and the Czech Republic is the 
sign of the mismatch negative (i.e. foreign currency deposits exceed foreign currency loans). 
In Latin America in contrast, the cross-country correlation between U.S. dollar loans and U.S. 
dollar deposits was close to 1 in 2012, following a decline during the 2000s. Within Latin 
America, Uruguay is an outlier, with a negative currency mismatch of 40% of GDP in 2012, 
7. Yet we do not have data on assets and liabilities different from loans and deposits in foreign currency held by banks. If 
we account for those “other” assets and liabilities, the currency mismatch may be amplified or reduced. For instance, 
banks may hedge net short positions in loans-deposits with long positions in other dollar-denominated assets and, 
therefore, match their foreign currency positions, reducing or at least balancing the indirect exchange rate induced risk. 
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Chart 2
Source: National central banks.
Note: The data refer to deposits made by the private nonfinancial sector and are adjusted for exchange rate developments (using January 2008 exchange 
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reflecting the absorption of substantial amounts of U.S. dollar deposits from Argentina after 
the crisis in the early 2000s. 
 
Fourth, the degree of dollarization is also reflected by foreign currency holdings 
abroad and the issuance of foreign currency debt in international markets. Such offshore 
dollarization is seen as less damaging than domestic dollarization, since the default risk is 
transferred to foreign institutions, although it usually reveals deficiencies in the domestic credit 
markets and distrust in the banking system. Yet for most of the CESEE countries offshore 
deposits represent only a small fraction of total deposits and have decreased in the sample 
period. In Latin America, offshore deposits are more relevant but have also decreased from 
the early 2000s (chart 4). Corporate issuance of foreign currency debt has gained relevance 
and grown exponentially in both Latin America and CESEE, as the accommodative stance of 
monetary policy in developed countries has sharply reduced funding costs in international 
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Chart 4
Source: BIS.
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Source: National central banks.
Note: The mismatch is measured as the difference between foreign currency loans and foreign currency deposits as a % of GDP. Data for Brazil and 
Colombia are not available.
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markets for foreign currency loans in domestic markets. The pattern in the two regions is very 
similar: an increase of corporate issuance in international markets and in foreign currency. In 
absolute figures, the importance of foreign funding sources remains limited for these 
economies, though (around 2% of GDP and 5% of total bank credit in both regions).8
Finally, the countries in the two regions differ somewhat with respect to exchange 
rate and inflation rate developments and volatilities as well as with regard to the interest rate 
differential (i.e. the difference between the price of loans in foreign and in domestic currency).
  
9 
Interestingly, while the interest rate differential (chart 5) has stabilized or decreased in some 
countries with a high degree of dollarization in both regions (e.g. Peru and Uruguay; Croatia 
and Albania), it remains at elevated levels of up to 10 percentage points difference in other 
highly dollarized countries in both regions (e.g. Serbia and Argentina), not least due to the 
persistently high inflation rates in these countries. Inflation volatility has decreased in all 
countries under review since 2005 (chart 6), with the exception of Latvia, which nevertheless 
registered very low inflation rates and even some episodes of deflation in recent years. Going 
further, although the majority of countries have seen their exchange rates appreciate since 
2001, partly explained by the increase in income per capita and related to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, some differences arise in terms of exchange rate volatility, which 
decreased strongly in CESEE countries and has increased slightly in those Latin American 
countries with inflation targeting.10
 
 
 
                                                                            
8. Data for fixed income issuance come from the Dealogic database and cover all corporate bonds and medium-term 
notes placed by domestic firms and sovereigns in domestic and international markets. 
9. The majority of studies included in section 4 use as a proxy for the interest rate differential a somewhat different 
calculation, the difference between the domestic interest rate and the U.S. or euro area interest rate, probably as it is 
difficult to recover long time series data for these differentials, and as some of the domestic markets for foreign currency 
loans or deposits were developed only from 2000 onwards. 
10. Inflation and exchange rate volatility can be calculated in different ways. The papers included in the next section use 
both rolling standard deviations of inflation rates or volatility extracted using statistical models like GARCH. As we only try 
to illustrate the recent evolution of volatility, we opt for the easier calculation method. 
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and national central banks.
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Source: National central banks.
Note: 12-month moving average of CPI inflation standard deviation.
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Source: National central banks and 
Note: 12-month moving average of a broad nominal effective exchange rate.
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2 Literature Review of Loan Dollarization: Do the Two Regions Differ? 
Since dollarization was a widespread phenomenon in Latin America during the 1980s and 
1990s, most of the early studies on dollarization focused on this region (e.g. Barajas and 
Morales, 2003). Although more recently the focus has turned to the CESEE countries, with an 
increasing number of studies based on survey data, traditionally the majority of studies used 
aggregate data and therefore focused on macro-level determinants, such as inflation, 
exchange rate depreciation and their volatilities. These determinants are shown to exert 
ambiguous effects on foreign currency lending depending on whether they express demand 
or supply factors. Most studies also included the interest rate differential, which is generally 
perceived to be more of a demand-side driver of foreign currency loans while indicating 
supply-side effects at the same time.11
Regarding supply-side factors, Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2011) argue 
that currency matching plays a key role in the lenders’ choice of currency denomination and 
hence is supposed to exert a positive influence on loan dollarization. Matching willingness is 
strengthened by supervisory regulation of banks’ net foreign positions (see e.g. Luca and 
Petrova, 2008). For Latin America, Barajas and Morales (2003) find that foreign currency loans 
are strongly correlated with deposits in foreign currency. Fidrmuc, Hake and Stix (2013) find 
this correlation to be lower in CESEE, implying a lower relevance of funding in foreign 
currency compared to the Latin American region, although in some countries that matching 
behavior is supported by the large share of remittances (e.g. Albania and Serbia), which might 
also partially explain the size of deposit dollarization in those countries. 
 Moreover, both the empirical and theoretical studies 
traditionally include predominantly supply-side determinants such as the degree of deposit 
dollarization. 
The interest rate differential – the explanatory variable used most often in the 
literature – reflects macroeconomic stability along with the relative price of foreign currency 
loans. If demand factors were dominant, we would expect a positive effect on loan 
dollarization: borrowers would take out more foreign currency loans as long as they are 
cheaper than domestic currency loans. In turn, a higher domestic interest rate would be an 
incentive for banks to lend in domestic currency. Yet in some cases a positive relation 
between spreads and dollarization might indicate also a supply-side factor, since banks might 
be offering cheaper foreign currency loans in an effort to gain market share (Steiner, 2011). 
The tradeoff between currency risk and real interest rate risk (in the case of lower-than-
expected inflation) explains the positive impact of the interest rate differential found in most of 
the studies on foreign currency lending in Latin America (e.g. Esquivel-Monge, 2007, for 
Ecuador). Interestingly, the empirical evidence for the CESEE countries is rather mixed. 
Rosenberg and Tirpák (2009) find that the interest rate differential is a robust determinant of 
foreign currency loans in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and in Croatia. In 
contrast, Brown and De Haas (2012), using bank-level data, find that foreign currency lending 
is negatively correlated with spreads in countries where those spreads declined in relation to 
the euro. Consequently, according to their interpretation, the macroeconomic stability which 
led to interest rate declines is a stronger determinant of foreign currency loans than spread 
advantages. 
                                                                            
11. For example, the interest rate differential has been shown to play a major role in the recent process of funding 
sources substitution in some Latin American countries, ranging from bank credit in foreign currency in the domestic 
market to fixed income issuance in foreign currency in international markets. 
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The impact of inflation and its volatility on foreign currency loans depends on the 
tradeoff between currency and real interest rate risks. High volatility of domestic inflation 
would induce more borrowing in foreign currency since the real interest rates would be more 
stable than domestic rates. Furthermore, higher inflation could induce larger savings in foreign 
currency, which at the same time positively influences lending in foreign currency (i.e. a 
supply-side perspective). In addition, even in a low inflation environment, the hysteresis effect 
may persist and induce borrowing in foreign currency (i.e. demand-side perspective) (Arteta, 
2002). Regarding inflation, studies based on aggregate data and survey-based studies 
generally show a positive effect on loan dollarization (e.g. Zettelmeyer, Nagy and Jeffrey, 
2010), while some studies also show a significant negative effect (e.g. Steiner, 2011). 
Empirical studies also include (real) exchange rate depreciation and its volatility as 
determinants of loan dollarization in CESEE and Latin America. The theoretical impact of 
these variables is ambiguous, as it may affect the behavior of lenders and borrowers 
differently. Banks may try to shift the exchange rate risk to borrowers, increasing the supply of 
foreign currency loans, especially when they hold a large amount of foreign currency liabilities. 
At the same time, borrowers might reject the exchange rate risk and demand fewer foreign 
currency loans, especially in countries with stable monetary environments. By and large, a 
negative impact actually reflects the credit default risk of unhedged loans, since depreciation 
makes servicing loans more costly and risk-averse banks would reduce the supply of foreign 
currency loans especially if borrowers are not able to hedge against the currency risk. 
Nevertheless, in some cases corporate borrowers may be willing to accept foreign currency 
loans as a commitment device, signaling to lenders the firm’s quality (and potentially a lower 
cost of default) and thus having to some extent a counterintuitive positive effect on loan 
dollarization from the demand side.12
Finally, the studies on CESEE and Latin America differ in a number of ways. First, 
papers on Latin America usually focus on the effects of institutional frameworks on 
dollarization and include only some of the “traditional” factors as control variables. For 
instance, Honig (2009) and Arteta (2002) analyze the effects of the exchange rate regime on 
currency mismatches, while Barajas and Morales (2003) show how financial integration and 
domestic market developments affect dollarization. Furthermore Garcia-Escribano (2010) and 
Garcia-Escribano and Sosa (2011) analyze how policy frameworks affect the process of 
dedollarization. In CESEE-related empirical studies, we find the institutional dimension of the 
empirical research replaced to some extent by agents’ present or past experiences, not least 
due to the larger availability of survey-level data (e.g. Brown and de Haas, 2012; Fidrmuc, 
Hake and Stix, 2013). Second, unlike the studies on Latin American countries, the majority of 
 When turning to empirical evidence, Barajas and 
Morales (2003) for Latin America and Luca and Petrova (2008) for a set of 21 transition 
countries infer that exchange rate volatility tends to reduce credit dollarization in the short run. 
In contrast, Honig (2009) points to a positive impact on loan dollarization in a study including 
a large sample of emerging market economies. Rosenberg and Tirpák (2009) find that 
exchange rate volatility has negative but small effects on the share of foreign currency loans in 
the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and Croatia. Furthermore, past exchange 
rate volatility is not found to play a significant role in explaining loan dollarization, which has 
been explained by the increase of the perceived stability of the exchange rate due to EU 
membership making economic agents more willing to accept the currency risk. 
                                                                            
12. For instance, as shown by Alberola, Molina and Navia (2005) governments have the incentive to announce a fixed 
exchange rate regime just to regain access to cheaper international financial markets. This could explain the 
counterintuitive result that fixed exchange rate regimes are not related to stronger fiscal discipline, as the theory of fiscal 
dominance would imply.  
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studies on CESEE countries are based on survey data (either bank-, household- or firm-level), 
which permits some insights into whether the loan currency was chosen by the borrower or 
by the lender. Third, the papers on Latin America typically cover the 1990s and the early 
2000s, while some of the papers on CESEE include more recent periods, i.e. also the 
2008/2009 financial crisis. Fourth, including the MVP ratio13
                                                                            
13. The MVP ratio was initially used in portfolio choice theory, i.e. in studying the currency composition of deposits. Only 
later studies, covering mostly the CESEE region, also used the MVP ratio to analyze the determinants of loan 
dollarization. Given the lack of observations on the MVP ratio included as an explanatory variable in studies on the Latin 
American region, we cannot include the MVP ratio in this meta-analysis. 
 as a key determinant of foreign 
currency loans is very common for studies on CESEE but an exception for studies focused on 
Latin America, which usually substitute inflation and exchange rate volatilities. Finally, many 
studies on dollarization in Latin America focus on the liabilities side rather than the assets side 
of the banking system, which may be due to easier access to data on dollar deposits. At the 
same time, the dollarization process was believed to have begun with deposits and to have 
moved to the loans side of the banking portfolio due to official restrictions to net foreign 
currency positions in some countries. Furthermore, the focus on currency substitution in the 
studies on Latin America may have been motivated by the region’s long history of 
hyperinflation, prompting people and banks to rush into U.S. dollars to protect their incomes 
and assets from inflation. 
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3 Meta-Analysis Methodology and Data Description 
3.1  Meta-Analysis Approach 
The majority of empirical studies on the determinants of foreign currency lending in both 
regions studied in this paper build upon linear regression models of the following type: 
 ijtijtijt XFCL εα ++=                                                     (1) 
where FCL stands for the share (or the change in the share) of foreign currency loans, X is a 
matrix of explanatory variables and ε  is an error term. Usually equation (1) is estimated for 
sectors, indexed by i, in one or more countries, indexed by j, while t is the time period.  
Similarly, in microeconomic (survey) studies, which are more common for the CESEE 
region, the dependent variable is a dummy which measures whether a given borrower (firm or 
household) has taken out a foreign currency loan. Correspondingly, the following model is applied: 
 )(X)|1(FCLijt βα ijtXFP +==                                          (2) 
where F(.) is a nonlinear function, usually the cumulative normal distribution function for probit 
models or the logistic function for logit models. Similar to Crespo Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and 
Hake (2011), we justify the inclusion of both micro- and macro-econometric results by the fact 
that all the reviewed studies report marginal probability effects which are similar to the 
elasticities reported in a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  
Using the corresponding parameter estimates from 32 studies that deal with the 
determinants of foreign currency loans in CESEE and Latin America, we estimate 
metaregression equations to highlight possible differences in the estimated coefficients. To 
this effect, we split the sample of coefficients into two regional samples14
The metaregression equation, which is typically given by 
 and then perform 
estimations for the CESEE sample, the Latin American sample and the combined sample. 
lmlmlm UD ++= θµβˆ                                                       (3) 
was estimated separately for each of the determinants of foreign currency loans. Thereby, βˆ
is the estimate corresponding to variable l in study m, and D is a matrix containing variables 
reflecting various characteristics of the study. It is further assumed that u is the regression 
error term, which may have a different distribution for each of the analyzed studies. With the 
exception of the “observation year” variable, the matrix D includes mostly binary variables, 
which summarize information related to data definitions, data structure, estimation method 
and included control variables in the collected publication (see table 1).15
 
 
                                                                            
14. Several studies include both regions (see table 2). This is why the sum of the number of coefficients from the two 
separate groups exceeds the number of coefficients of the overall sample. 
15. While we tried different specifications of the metaregressions, the final set of control variables does not always 
include all potential control variables, not least due to collinearity. However, a comparison of several approaches shows 
that by and large the estimated intercept remains unchanged. 
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The year of observation is meant to highlight trends in foreign currency lending and its 
analysis, such as structural changes (e.g. an increasing role of foreign currency loans) or 
changes in the generally accepted views on the determinants of foreign currency loans. Related 
to this, another variable reflects whether a study covers a post-crisis period, i.e. periods 
following the 2008/2009 crisis or other crisis periods as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
To account for features of the underlying data, we also distinguish between publications using 
Control variables Definition
Micro study Binary dummy: 1 if a study is based on survey data, 0 otherwise.
Fixed effects Binary dummy: 1 if a study accounts for either country or industry fixed effects, 0 otherwise.
Bias correction
Binary dummy: 1 if a study accounts for either an estimation bias by instrumental estimation or selection
correction (instrumental estimators and Heckman selection model), 0 otherwise.
Hedging
Post-crisis
Binary dummy: 1 if a study includes a time period following the outbreak of the recent economic and
financial crisis (i.e. after 2008) or earlier crisis periods in Latin America (according to Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009), 0 otherwise.
CIS countries Binary dummy: 1 if a study includes CIS countries, 0 otherwise.
Latin America Binary dummy: 1 if a study includes Latin American countries, 0 otherwise.
CESEE countries Binary dummy: 1 if a study includes CESEE countries, 0 otherwise.
EU enlargement Binary dummy: 1 if a study accounts also for the perspective of EU accession or euro adoption, 0 otherwise.
Other countries
Binary dummy: 1 if a study includes other countries (i.e. other than CESEE, CIS and Latin America), 0
otherwise.
FX restrictions included Binary dummy: 1 if a study accounts for foreign currency restrictions, 0 otherwise.
Pegged FX regime
otherwise.
Interest rate differential
independent variable
Binary dummy: 1 if a study and a specification include the interest rate differential as an independent
variable, 0 otherwise.
FX depreciation
independent variable
Binary dummy: 1 if a study and a specification include exchange rate depreciation as an independent
variable, 0 otherwise.
FX volatility independent
variable
Binary dummy: 1 if a study and a specification include exchange rate volatility as an independent variable, 0
otherwise.
Inflation volatility
independent variable
Binary dummy: 1 if a study and a specification include infl ation volatility as an independent variable, 0
otherwise.
Inflation independent
variable
Binary dummy: 1 if a study and a specification include infl ation as an independent variable, 0 otherwise.
FX deposits
independent variable 0 otherwise.
Openness Binary dummy: 1 if a study accounts for the trade openness of a country, 0 otherwise.
Year of observation Continuous variable measured as the deviation from the mean year of the period of observation.
Source: Authors' compilation.
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aggregate data or micro datasets. Through the latter dummy, we also account for potential 
differences between firm and household data, as they may affect the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficients of some of the determinants of foreign currency lending (i.e. exchange rate 
depreciation or exchange rate volatility). In addition, we include several dummies which reflect 
whether the estimations have accounted for important control variables (such as openness of 
the economy) which could impact the magnitude and significance of some determinants (e.g. 
exchange rate volatility). Finally, we also account for the interrelation between the different 
determinants of foreign currency loans, to establish whether an estimation including one 
determinant has also accounted for another determinant from our set. 
Regarding the methodology applied in the studies, we define dummy variables for 
models with fixed effects (such as country, region or firm fixed effects) and with selection bias 
treatment (instrumental variables approach, Heckman two-step procedure, etc.). Further 
dummies encompass the geographic focus of the paper, to reflect the inclusion of CIS or 
other countries (e.g. Israel), as well as an EU enlargement variable, which indicates whether a 
study accounts for the EU accession or euro adoption perspective.16
To support and verify the robustness of our metaregression results, we estimate 
equation (3) with two methods. First, we perform a weighted least squares (WLS) estimation, 
using the precision of each parameter estimate (measured by the inverse of their standard errors 
or standard deviation) as a weight in the regression. This weighting approach is consistent, for 
instance, with Knell and Stix (2005) or Crespo Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and Hake (2011, 2013), but 
its controversy has been acknowledged by various authors (e.g. Krueger, 2003). 
 Finally, we also consider 
whether a study accounted for specific regulations on lending in foreign currency, as this 
could reduce the importance of the other foreign currency determinants. Since not all the 
regression models reported in the sampled studies include information on regulations on 
foreign currency lending, our metaregression specifications do not include all these variables 
for each of the parameters of interest. 
Second, we apply the random effect maximum likelihood (REML) approach (see e.g. 
Thompson and Sharp, 1999) to address the decisive drawback of the WLS methodology, i.e. 
the fact that it cannot deal with the potential heterogeneity in estimates across studies (i.e the 
between-studies variance).  
In particular, if we assume that the true value of β  can only be imperfectly 
approximated by θµ lmD+ , so that ilmD ωθµβ ++=1 , where ω  is a normally 
distributed random variable with zero mean and variance 2ωσ  equal to the standard error 
reported for β  in individual studies, then (3) can be written as 
lmilmlm uD +++= ωθµβˆ                                                     (4) 
Thereby, it is assumed that ω  and u are uncorrelated. Hence, this specification is 
able to account for both between-study variance, given by 2ωσ , and the individual variance of 
the estimate reflecting the relative precision across the observed values of βˆ  (Crespo 
Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and Hake, 2013). 
                                                                            
16. The EU accession perspective and the euro adoption perspective were included only in the estimations for all 
coefficients and for the coefficients from studies on the CESEE countries. 
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3.2  Metadata Set and Descriptive Statistics 
For our meta-analysis we use estimates from 32 empirical papers on foreign currency loans in 
CESEE and Latin America.17
The coefficients estimated for the explanatory variables included in the studies 
highlight several remarkable differences between the two regions (table 3). First, the 
coefficient estimated for the interest rate differential, while surprisingly close to zero for 
CESEE on average at only 0.009, is significantly different for Latin America at 0.714. 
Second, apart from the means for inflation, the means of the coefficients differ significantly 
between the two samples. Third, there are substantial within and between variations for all 
variables in the two samples. Fourth, the share of significant coefficients is above 50% for 
exchange rate depreciation, foreign currency deposits as well as the interest rate differential 
in the CESEE sample, but only for inflation volatility in the Latin American country. Finally, 
inflation is the only variable for which the t-test, which accounts for the differences between 
the mean coefficients of the two country groups, fails to reject the null hypothesis (i.e. the 
means are equal). 
 We cover the main factors that according to the literature explain 
loan dollarization. From the seven determinants discussed by Crespo Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and 
Hake (2011) we have to drop one (i.e. MVP) due to the surprisingly few times it was included 
in studies on loan dollarization in Latin America. Likewise we had to ignore the choice of 
exchange rate regime, or the degree of financial integration and domestic market 
development. Those variables are only included in a few specific studies, yielding only an 
insufficient number of observations. Therefore, although proven to be relevant, they are 
excluded from our analysis. Yet ultimately, this exercise provides us with nearly 1,200 
estimates, most of which include the interest rate differential (see table 2). 
 
  
                                                                            
17. We used various sources of information in the period from February 2011 to January 2013 (e.g. the EconLit 
Database) to search for papers investigating the determinants of foreign currency loans with the only condition of 
including either the CESEE countries or Latin American countries. Several papers, exclusively investigating the CESEE 
region, were published first as working papers and then as journal articles. Both versions were surveyed and included in 
the metaregressions unless the journal article is completely identical to the working paper version. 
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Studies Period Countries Data sample Dependent variable Determinants included
Arteta (2005)
1975/
1990–2000
92 countries Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential, inflation, exchange rate
depreciation
Barajas and Morales (2003) Latin America Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans the
private sector
Interest rate differential, FX deposits
Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and
Jurgilas (2007, 2011)
2000–2006
24 CESEE and CIS
countries
Macro-level data
Share of FX loans to the private
sector and change in the share
of FX loans
Interest rate differential, MVP
Brown, Ongena and Yesin
(2009, 2011)
2002–2005
CESEE and CIS
countries
Firm survey data Dummy: FX loan (yes/no)
Interest rate differential, inflation volatility,
exchange rate volatility, FX deposits
Brown, Kirschenmann and
Ongena (2010)
2003–2007 Bulgaria Firm survey data Dummy: FX loan (yes/no) Interest rate differential, inflation volatility
Brown and De Haas (2010,
2012)
2001, 2004
20 CESEE and CIS
countries
Bank survey data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential, inflation volatility,
exchange rate volatility
Brzoza-Brzezina,
Chmielewski and
Nied wied inska (2010)
1997–2008 4 CESEE countries Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential
Csajbók, Hudecz and
Tamási (2010)
1999–2008 CESEE EU countries Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the household sector
Interest rate differential, exchange rate volatility
Esquivel-Monge (2007) 1993–2007 Costa Rica Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential,  exchange rate
depreciation, inflation volatility
Fidrmuc, Hake and Stix
(2011, 2013)
2007–2010 9 CESEE countries
Household survey
data
Dummy: FX loan (yes/no)
Interest rate differential, inflation volatility,
exchange rate volatility, MVP
Galiani, Levy Yeyati and
Schargrodky (2003)
1993–2001 Argentina Firm-level data Dollar-to-total debt ratio Exchange rate depreciation
Garcia-Escribano (2010) 2001–2009 Peru Macro-level data Change in loan dollarization
Interest rate differential, inflation, exchange rate
volatility, exchange rate depreciation
Haiss and Rainer (2012) 1999–2007 13 CESEE countries
Firm-level data,
household-level
data
Share of U.S. dollar credit in
total credit
Interest rate differential, inflation, FX deposits
Honig (2009) 1988–2000 90 countries Macro-level data
Share of U.S. dollar credit in
total credit
Exchange rate volatility, exchange rate
depreciation, inflation, infl ation volatility, MVP
Kamil and Rai (2010) 1999–2008
Latin America and
Caribbean
Bank-level data Change in loan dollarization
Interest rate differential,  exchange rate
depreciation
Lane and Shambaugh
(2009)
1996–2004 117 countries Macro-level data FX exposure Exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility
Luca and Petrova (2008) 1990–2003
21 CESEE and CIS
countries
Macro-level data
Ratio of FX loans in loans to the
corporate sector
Interest rate differential,  exchange rate
depreciation, FX deposits
Melvin and Ladman (1991) 1980-1987 Bolivia Bank-level data Dummy: FX loan (yes/no) Inflation
Mora (2012) 1998–2003 Mexico Firm-level data Change in loan dollarization
Interest rate differential,  exchange rate
depreciation, FX deposits
Neanidis (2010) 1991–2010
24 CESEE and CIS
countries
Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential, exchange rate volatility,
exchange rate depreciation, inflation, FX
deposits
Neanidis and Savva (2009) 1993–2006
CESEE and CIS
countries
Macro-level data Change in loan dollarization
Interest rate differential, exchange rate
depreciation, change in inflation rate, MVP, FX
deposits
Peiers and Wrase (1997) 1980–1987 Bolivia Firm-level data Dummy: FX loan (yes/no)
Interest rate differential, exchange rate volatility,
exchange rate depreciation, inflation rate
volatility
Rosenberg and Tirpák
(2008)
1999–2007
CESEE EU
countries, Croatia
Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential
Rosenberg and Tirpák
(2009)
1999–2007
CESEE EU
countries, Croatia
Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential, exchange rate volatility,
FX deposits
Steiner (2009, 2011) 1996–2007
CESEE EU countries
Croatia
Macro-level data
Share of FX loans in loans to
the private sector
Interest rate differential, exchange rate
depreciation, inflation, FX deposits
Uzun (2005) 1990–2001
Latin America,
Turkey
Firm-level data Dollar-to-total debt ratio
Interest rate differential, exchange rate
depreciation, inflation
Zettelmeyer, Nagy and
Jeffrey (2010)
2000–2008;
2002–2005
CESEE, CIS; Latin
American countries
Macro-level data,
firm survey-level
data
of FX loans in loans to the
private sector
Interest rate differential, exchange rate
depreciation, inflation, FX deposits
Table 2. Surveyed Studies
Source: Authors' compilation.
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T-test
Variable
Number of
observations
Mean
Standard
deviation
Min Max
Share of
significant
coefficients
Number of
observations
Mean
Standard
deviation
Min Max
Share of
significant
coefficients
Exchange rate
volatility
91 -0.48 1,023 -4 1,198 34.6 61 0.217 0.994 -2.53 3.45 36.1 -3.67***
Exchange rate
depreciation
117 0.193 0.664 -2 1.31 70.5 89 -0.102 0.415 -0.972 1.04 40.7 3.52***
Inflation 87 -0.037 0.115 -0.347 0.119 32.4 78 -0.238 1,989 -9.7 5.7 30.3 -0.81
Inflation volatility 44 0.924 4,451 -10.01 18.6 45.5 55 4,208 8,134 -4.65 25 72.7 -2.40**
FX deposits 77 0.406 0.435 -1 2 70.5 30 0.189 0.454 -0.576 0.965 40.6 3.52***
Table 3. Metastatistics
0.714
CESEE countries Latin America
Interest rate
differential
275 0.009 1,122 -4,005 4,142 51.6 109
Note: The t-test establishes the difference between the means of the impact of the respective determinant in the two groups of coefficients. *(**)[***] stands for significance at the
10%(5%)[1%] level.
1,731 -2.8 9.3 45.3 -5.87***
Source: Authors' calculations.
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4 Metaresults: The Determinants of Foreign Currency Loans  
Another purpose of the meta-analysis is to clearly identify the adjusted (“true”) effect of the 
individual determinants of foreign currency loans. Tables 4 to 9 present the results of the 
metaregression analysis (shown by the intercepts of equations 3 and 4) for the six most 
common determinants of foreign currency lending, as established with the REML approach 
and cross-checked with the WLS approach. Our preferred estimation method is the REML 
approach since it considers both the between and within studies variation of the coefficients, 
as the WLS approach primarily focuses on the within studies variation. For each determinant, 
we first perform the estimation for the set of coefficients including both regions, Latin America 
and CESEE, and then we run two separate regional estimations.  
As the interest rate differential is the determinant with the largest number of 
coefficients (358), we presume that it will deliver the most reliable metaresults (table 4). 
Interestingly, we find a positive and significant coefficient only for the Latin American region, 
which we interpret as a predominantly demand-driven phenomenon. In contrast, the 
coefficient for the CESEE sample is not statistically significant, thus confirming results from a 
similar analysis (i.e. Crespo Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and Hake, 2011) that the interest rate 
differentials do not appear to play a major role in the dollarization of loans in that region. This 
result is confirmed by both methods applied and the relatively low coefficient of determination 
(R²) in the metaregression for the CESEE region. In fact, this result may be an indication that 
some indirect supply-side effects may be also in place. In the Latin American case, the 
coefficient actually became more relevant in recent years, as reflected by the positive sign of 
the dummy variable “year of observation.” This finding appears to be intuitive: once high 
inflation abated and countries at the same time regained access to international markets, the 
demand-side considerations become more relevant for determining the proportion of foreign 
loans in private agents’ liabilities. Interestingly, including the post-crisis period reinforces the 
positive impact of the interest rate differential, while the negative coefficient of “openness” 
implies that it might be a proxy for access to fixed income in international markets or other 
sources of international financing. 
Both theoretical and empirical evidence implies that exchange rate depreciation 
should have a negative impact on both demand and supply of foreign currency loans, since it 
reflects the credit default risk of unhedged loans. Yet a potential positive impact could be 
explained by the expected stability of the repayments. The results from the metaregression in 
table 5 confirm that this effect is significant and negative for Latin America, but not statistically 
significant for the CESEE sample of coefficients. In addition, exchange rate depreciation was 
more relevant before the 2008/2009 crisis (as shown by the “pre-crisis” dummy), as the 
majority of the currencies in Latin America has shown an appreciating trend since early 2009. 
The effect of exchange rate depreciation is reduced by a pegged exchange rate regime, as it 
generates incentives to increase loans (and deposits) in domestic currency as pegging 
(apparently) reduces uncertainty about the exchange rate developments. Finally, being a 
commodity exporter reduces the effect of the depreciation through higher access to hard 
foreign currency; foreign exchange restrictions have the same effect, as expected. 
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The results in table 6 confirm the negative effect of exchange rate volatility in Latin 
America, implying that a less volatile exchange rate induces borrowers to take out more loans 
in U.S. dollars if the interest rate spreads are large enough. This could also be related to the 
search for macroeconomic stability, and could also be masking the effects of inflation, as the 
majority of countries in the region, which used to suffer from hyperdepreciation and 
hyperinflation, today pursue inflation targets with a floating exchange rate. The negative 
coefficient for the year of observation also points to a higher effect of exchange rate volatility 
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
Intercept 1.748*** 0.163 2.981*** 0.584** 0.192 1.525***
(0.178) (0.122) (1.244) (0.276) (0.101) (0.273)
FX volatility independent variable 0.191** -0.211 -0.016 -0.277 -0.732*** -0.003
(0.095) (0.145) (0.154) (0.191) (0.058) (0.073)
FX depreciation independent variable 0.637*** 0.078 0.725*** 0.570*** 0.121 -0.003
(0.105) (0.108) (0.229) (0.200) (0.199) (0.018)
Inflation independent variable -0.397*** 0.144 1.197*** -0.272* -0.400** 1.992**
(0.112) (0.110) (0.318) (0.153) (0.167) (0.842)
Inflation volatility independent variable 0.395*** 0.880*** 0.318** -0.257 0.527*** 0.021
(0.113) (0.299) (0.152) (0.153) (0.099) (0.067)
FX deposits independent variable -0.346*** -0.096 -0.222 0.131 -0.027 0.152
(0.090) (0.087) (0.212) (0.086) (0.027) (0.245)
EU enlargement 0.362*** 0.332*** 0.249** 0.103
(0.109) (0.105) (0.105) (0.091)
Openness -0.449*** -0.185 -1.913*** -0.576* -0.430* -2.227***
(0.115) (0.145) (0.220) (0.292) (0.280) (0.245)
FX restriction included -0.470*** 0.864*** -3.226*** -0.347** -0.129*** -0.395
(0.118) (0.206) (0.574) (0.164) (0.088) (0.457)
Pegged FX regime 0.848*** -0.305*** -2.307*** 0.183 -0.174 0.000
(0.173) (0.099) (0.325) (0.171) (0.292) (0.000)
Year of observation -0.025 -0.347*** -0.089** -0.009 -0.435*** 0.113
(0.017) (0.057) (0.036) (0.025) (0.030) (0.082)
Post-crisis period 1.135*** 1.092*** 2.362*** -0.395 -0.369*
(0.234) (0.332) (0.706) (0.250) (0.190)
Micro study -1.401*** -1.607*** -2.131*** -0.238 -0.046 -0.241
(0.110) (0.224) (0.226) (0.180) (0.101) (0.377)
Fixed effects -0.793*** 0.811 0.232 -0.359 0.151** 0.012
(0.102) (0.093) (0.198) (0.252) (0.056) (0.012)
Bias correction -0.528*** -0.038 -1.198*** 0.104 0.199*** -1.398*
(0.105) (0.085) (0.230) (0.171) (0.048) (0.606)
CIS countries -0.581*** -0.291** -0.066 -0.053 -0.226
(0.207) (0.131) (0.124) (0.102) (0.165)
Latin American countries -0.817** -1.342*** 0.313 -1.205***
(0.320) (0.241) (0.290) (0.276)
CESEE countries -0.739*** 0.748***
(0.184) (0.343)
Other countries -0.199* -0.062 0.237 0.029 -0.840
(0.119) (0.079) (0.167) (0.093) (1.804)
Observations 358 275 109 358 275 109
R² 0.713 0.268 0.514 0.245 0.288 0.957
Random effect maximum likelihood
(REML)
Weighted least squares (WLS)
Source: Authors  calculations.
Note: *(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. Robust standard errors clustered by study in brackets. Total number of coefficients of "All
countries" results from the coefficients from studies including either Latin American countries or CESEE countries or both.
Table 4. Metaregression Estimates: Interest Rate Differential
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in the past. In contrast, this coefficient is positive for the CESEE sample. In other words, 
supply-side factors could be more relevant for explaining dollarization in that region, since 
risk-averse lenders might be more willing to supply foreign currency loans in order to match 
their foreign currency positions and reduce currency risk, i.e. the prevalence of indirect 
exchange rate risk. 
 
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
Intercept -1.123** -0.258 -0.707* -0.770** -0.095 -0.527***
(-0.389) (-0.286) (-0.397) (-0.266) (-0.312) (-0.012)
0.104 0.109 0.002**
(0.174) (0.024) (0.001)
FX volatility independent variable 0.338** -0.780** -0.320*** -0.005 -0.703
(0.138) (0.354) (0.061) (0.191) (0.601)
Inflation independent variable 0.394*** -0.771** 0.372*** 0.151*** -0.715 0.321***
(0.148) (0.263) (0.081) (0.003) (0.640) (0.000)
FX deposits independent variable 0.438*** 0.434*** 0.630*** 0.056*
(0.123) (0.149) (0.161) (0.268)
EU enlargement -0.295* 0.355 -0.325 0.784**
(0.171) (0.327) (0.450) (0.307)
Openness 0.530*** 1.019*** -0.689*** 0.684***
(0.180) (0.336) (0.214) (0.186)
FX restrictions included -0.213 0.250 0.399 -0.736** -0.918 0.386***
(0.287) (0.864) (0.365) (0.338) (1.020) (0.019)
Pegged FX regime 0.561*** -0.250 -0.506 0.736** 0.918 -0.475***
(0.293) (0.754) (0.362) (0.338) (1.020) (0.004)
Year of observation -0.034 0.103 0.003
(0.021) (0.071) (0.007)
Post-crisis period 1.101*** -0.454 -0.355*** -0.343*** 0.000 -0.343***
(0.335) (0.434) (0.056) (0.022) (0.000) (0.008)
Micro study -0.282 -1.314** 0.338*** -0.143 -1.815** 0.325***
(0.204) (0.594) (0.057) (0.521) (0.630) (0.008)
Frim data 1.222*** 0.962** 0.541 1.019** 0.000
(0.206) (0.434) (0.346) (0.370) (0.000)
Bias correction -0.242** -0.593*** 0.230*** -0.286 -0.631 0.243***
(0.111) (0.157) (0.083) (0.350) (0.441) (0.019)
Other countries 1.148** -1.549** -0.649* 0.000 0.000
(0.529) (0.707) (0.355) (0.000) (0.000)
CIS countries -0.695** 0.494 -0.619* -0.359 0.283 -0.607***
(0.323) (0.682) (0.365) (0.364) (0.474) (0.004)
Latin American countries -1.307*** 0.786 -1.556*** -0.448
(0.422) (0.514) (0.384) (0.803)
CESEE countries 0.579 0.505
(0.428) (0.333)
Oil-exporting countries 0.284 0.016 0.571** 0.116 0.004*** 0.614***
(0.262) (0.400) (0.249) (0131) (0.000) (0.004)
Observations 166 117 89 166 117 89
R-squared 0.624 0.673 0.96 0.982 0.742 0.433
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: *(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. Robust standard errors clustered by study in brackets. Total number of coeffi cients of "All
countries" results from the coefficients from studies including either Latin American countries or CESEE countries or both.
Random effect maximum
likelihood (REML)
Weighted least squares (WLS)
Table 5. Metaregression Estimates: Exchange Rate Depreciation
Interest rate differential
independent variable
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Some studies test for the validity of inflation rate volatility (e.g. Zettelmeyer, Nagy and 
Jeffrey, 2010; Brown and De Haas, 2012; Esquivel-Monge, 2007) on top of including the 
inflation rate. Our metaregressions (tables 7 and 8) show that inflation and inflation volatility 
have the expected positive sign. Moreover, the latter has a very high coefficient, pointing to a 
strong relevance in both regions due to the long history of hyperinflation. Interestingly, we find 
higher inflation to boost foreign currency loans in Latin America but not in CESEE, implying 
that it is not the inflation rate per se but its volatility that matters. In the case of the Latin 
American countries, the coefficient for inflation could also mask the increase of foreign 
currency deposits in parallel with the increase in prices offsetting the loss of value of the 
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
Intercept -1.073** 1.223** -0.474* -0.872*** 1.351*** -0.926***
(0.532) (0.555) (0.269) (0.175) (0.007) (0.004)
0.023 -0.008 1.319*** 0.005 -0.008 1.594***
(0.050) (0.006) (0.104) (0.016) (0.000) (0.007)
FX depreciation independent variable -1.259*** -1.133 -1.211*** -1.136***
(0.289) (0.943) (0.150) (0.003)
Inflation independent variable -0.271** -0.125 -1.104*** -0.113 -0.086*** -0.957***
(0.104) (0.293) (0.110) (0.158) (0.002) (0.001)
Inflation volatility independent variable 0.300* 0.134 1.742*** 0.421** 0.136*** 1.858***
(0.177) (0.497) (0.162) (0.151) (0.012) (0.014)
FX deposits independent variable 0.300 -0.004 0.010 -0.003***
(0.038) (0.003) (0.150) (0.000)
EU enlargement -0.479*** 0.220 -1.049** -6.403***
(0.165) (0.323) (0.391) (1.762)
Openness -0.200 -0.064 0.195 -0.225*** -0.966***
(0.111) (0.497) (0.123) (0.005) (0.003)
FX restrictions included 0.282 -0.003 1.569** -0.003*** 0.000
(0.534) (0.904) (0.632) (0.000) (0.000)
Pegged FX regime -0.536*** -0.127 -0.587* -0.090***
(0.188) (0.995) (0.307) (0.002)
Year of observation -0.137*** -0.124 -0.171*** -0.045 1.498** -0.091**
(0.019) (0.078) (0.018) (0.035) (0.455) (0.035)
Post-crisis period -0.212* -2.750*** -0.617*** -0.029 0.000 -0.101
(0.122) (1.089) (0.154) (0.184) (0.000) (0.063)
Micro study 0.649*** 1.478*** 0.422*** 1.250*** 3.546*** -0.253***
(0.143) (0.556) (0.144) (0.335) (0.838) (0.006)
Fixed effects 0.005 -0.045 0.134 0.008 -0.156 0.066
(0.084) (0.061) (0.112) (0.027) (0.188) (0.037)
Bias correction 0.371** 0.046* 0.709*** 0.073 -13.898** 0.464
(0.158) (0.028) (0.132) (0.121) (4.036) (0.338)
FX restrictions included 1.013*** -0.003 1.569** -0.003*** 0.000
(0.222) (0.904) (0.632) (0.000) (0.000)
Latin American countries 1.420*** 2.878*** 1.818*** 0.562
(0.519) (0.839) (0.595) (0.414)
CESEE countries 0.785*** -1.186*** 0.623*** 0.056
(0.136) (0.105) (0.197) (0.746)
Other countries -0.363*** -2.704*** 0.041 -2.830*** 0.758***
(0.133) (0.813) (0.195) (0.008) (0.011)
Observations 113 52 61 113 52 61
R-squared 0.991 0.998 0.975 0.81 0.647 0.885
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Random effect maximum likelihood
(REML)
Weighted least squares (WLS)
Note: *(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. Robust standard errors clustered by study in brackets. Total number of coefficients of
"All countries" results from the coefficients from studies including either Latin American countries or CESEE countries or both.
Table 6. Metaregression Estimates: Exchange Rate Volatility
Interest rate differential
independent variable
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domestic currency. Moreover, both variables became less relevant as determinants of foreign 
currency loans in recent years (signs and significance of time trend and post-crisis variables), 
and are less relevant in countries with pegged exchange rate regimes and exchange rate 
restrictions. This result seems intuitive against the historical background of the Latin American 
countries, where strong money creation led to quick exchange rate depreciation, and hence 
to episodes of hyperinflation. Thus, pegged exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange rate 
restrictions were used to reduce exchange rate uncertainty and short-circuit the process 
described above, although they sometimes ended in hyperdepreciation and hyperinflation 
when fiscal consolidation was not implemented timely. 
  
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin America All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin America
Intercept 2.133*** 0.107 8.738*** 1.412* 1.083 6.928***
-0.36 (2.798) (1.639) (0.551) (0.008) (0.007)
3.747** 0.187*** 0.952
(1.231) (0.108) (0.693)
FX depreciation independent variable -8.293*** -0.036 2.701* -3.594***
(2.132) (1.780) (1.566) (1.127)
FX volatility independent variable 3.436*** -0.060 -0.059***
(1.300) (2.965) (0.000)
Inflation volatility independent variable 0.037*** 0.033 0.033 0.032***
(0.007) (0.033) (0.033) (0.000)
FX deposits independent variable 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FX restrictions included 0.530 -5.367*** -0.418 0.000 -11.245***
(0.355) (0.452) (0.475) (0.000) (0.007)
Pegged FX regime -1.296*** -0.033*** -0.191*** 0.343 -0.038*** -2.762***
(0.237) (0.008) (0.016) (0.450) (0.007) (0.003)
Year of observation -0.187*** -0.030*** -0.009*** -0.013** -0.038*** -0.008***
(0.029) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Micro study 0.784*** 0.378 0.994* 0.000 -2.100***
(0.164) (0.299) (0.524) (0.000) (0.001)
Fixed effects 0.083 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(0.085) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Bias correction 0.119 0.041** -0.183*** 0.472 0.010 -2.737***
(0.114) (0.020) (0.042) (0.410) (0.063) (0.000)
Post-crisis period 0.955*** -0.319 0.807 0.000 0.000
(0.227) (0.300) (0.497) (0.000) (0.000)
CIS countries 0.748 0.039 -0.452 -0.919 0.052*** 2.012***
(0.529) (0.853) (0.300) (0.536) (0.000) (0.002)
Latin American countries -2.14*** -2.017*** 2.694***
(0.228) (0.512) (0.041)
CESEE countries -8.794*** -0.888* 0.452***
(1.395) (0.508) (0.002)
Other countries 1.079* 1.795*** 0.000 0.645***
(0.520) (0.367) (0.000) (0.003)
Observations 111 87 78 111 87 78
R-squared 0.901 0.899 0.891 0.997 0.738 0.999
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Random effect maximum
likelihood (REML)
Weighted least squares (WLS)
Note: *(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. Robust standard errors clustered by study in brackets. Sample based on the set
of estimates which are presented as preferred estimates or baseline estimates in the respective papers.
Table 7. Metaregression Estimates: Inflation
Interest rate differential
independent variable
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Supply-side determinants are often proxied for by the share of foreign currency 
deposits in total deposits (see table 9).18 In particular, banks with high levels of foreign 
currency deposits shift currency risk towards their customers (i.e. indirect currency risk). As 
regards the metaresults, foreign currency deposits are a relevant determinant of loan 
dollarization in both regions, yet with an intercept pointing to an almost parity relation in Latin 
America19
                                                                            
18. However, it should be pointed out that a hedging at the micro level is also possible with borrowers also aiming to 
match their balance sheets. 
 while the coefficient is much lower in the CESEE region. In the Latin American 
19. Results have to be interpreted with caution as the number of observations is too low. 
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
Intercept 7.062*** 8.878* 21.273*** 4.954** 12.702*** 21.288***
(2.395) (5.194) (3.129) (1.950) (0.068) (0.916)
-1.010 -0.986 -1.011** -0.608 -1.250*** -0.632
(1.451) (1.122) (0.543) (0.874) (0.039) (0.923)
FX depreciation independent variable -3.522*** 12.188*** -10.624***
(1.772) (3.878) (2.748)
FX volatility independent variable -0.984 -0.984 3.436 -5.609
(4.498) (4.500) (6.583) (6.332)
Inflation independent variable 2.948** -9.604** -14.938*** -23.582***
(1.178) (4.768) (3.427) (0.593)
FX deposits independent variable 0.009 0.008 0.008***
(0.103) (2.075 (0.000)
Openness -2.156 6.352*** -19.617 0.000 4.044***
(2.408) (1.505) (15.401) (0.000) (0.416)
EU enlargement -0.749 -6.504*** 10.582 -5.826***
(1.833) (0.649) (34.568) (0.001)
FX restrictions included -9.810*** -9.608*** 0.000
(1.817) (4.590) (0.000)
Year of observation -0.201 -2.170*** 1.630*** 1.137 -1.944*** 1.475***
(0.211) (0.217) (0.225) (1.082) (0.000) (0.234)
Micro study -7.897*** 4.458*** -18.355 0.000 1.893***
(2.902) (1.331) (19.003) (0.000) (0.179)
Fixed effects -2.766** 4.157 0.013 0.316 3.255 0.042
(1.322) (5.246) (0.021) (0.210) (.) (0.103)
Post-crisis period 5.483*** -6.236*** 0.807 0.000 0.000
(1.799) (0.934) (0.497) (0.000) (0.000)
Bias correction -10.115 0.000
(13.111) (0.000)
Latin American countries -15.054*** -16.677***
(2.254) (0.106)
CESEE countries -8.500*** -7.638
(0.426) (8.144)
CIS countries 3.845** -4.315*** -2.445***
(1.764) (0.435) (0.294)
Observations 99 44 55 99 44 55
R-squared 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.702 0.695 0.703
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: *(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. Robust standard errors clustered by study in brackets. Sample based on the set
of estimates which are presented as preferred estimates or baseline estimates in the respective papers.
Random effect maximum
likelihood (REML)
Weighted least squares (WLS)
Table 8. Metaregression Estimates: Inflation Volatility
Interest rate differential
independent variable
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countries this result could be impaired by the fact that most banks tend to use domestic 
funding to increase their loans. In other words, banks rely more on the increase of deposits 
than on leverage to expand their loan portfolio, resulting in a loan-to-deposit ratio of close to 1 
after the banking crises suffered by the region in the early 1990s. Interestingly, the relevance 
of foreign currency deposits decreased during the sample period, as most countries started 
to regulate banks’ net exchange rate open positions. Finally, openness increases the effect of 
foreign currency deposits, as this variable could be considered as a proxy of access to 
international financial markets. 
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
All countries
CESEE
countries
Latin
America
Intercept 0.571*** 0.408*** 0.904*** 0.549* 0.099*** 0.839***
-0.214 (0.089) (0.020) -0.631 (0.040) (0.000)
-0.113 0.696*** -0.189 0.565***
-0.117 -0.161 -0.565 -0.179
FX depreciation independent variable -0.806*** -0.625*** -0.809** -0.713***
(0.096) (0.083) (0.374) (0.090)
FX volatility independent variable 0.227* 0.789*** 0.112 0.504*
(0.125) (0.123) (0.331) (0.160)
Inflation independent variable 0.193* -0.074*** 0.209 -0.165***
(0.082) (0.069) (0.225) (0.048)
Inflation volatility independent variable 0.247*
(0.126)
EU enlargement 0.104 -0.569*** -0.896*** -0.898***
(0.109) (0.103) (0.003) (0.000)
Openness 0.731*** 1.419*** 1.140*** 2.261*** 1.722*** 1.074***
(0.281) (0.161) (0.021) (0.708) (0.057) (0.000)
FX restrictions included 0.576*** 0.747*** -3.234*** 0.000 0.000
(0.118) (0.092) (0.556) (0.000) (0.000)
Pegged FX regime -1.468*** -1.887*** -1.297*** -1.777*** 0.000
(0.185) (0.156) (0.344) (0.077) (0.000)
Year of observation -0.109*** -0.179*** -0.009** -0.095 -0.174*** -0.020***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.004) (0.067) (0.007) (0.000)
Micro study 0.266 -1.155*** 0.236*** 1.862*** -1.167*** 0.238***
(0.204) (0.136) (0.002) (0.536) (0.062) (0.000)
Fixed effects -0.029 -0.005 -0.001 0.009 -0.009 0.000***
(0.072) (0.062) (0.002) (0.011) (0.033) (0.000)
Bias correction 0.312*** 0.081 0.728 0.042 0.000
(0.106) (0.077) (0.536) (0.025) (0.000)
Post-crisis period -0.327*** -0.011 0.000 0.000
(0.091) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000)
CIS countries 0.972*** 1.088*** 1.012*** 0.993*** 0.000
(0.138) (0.103) (0.035) (0.054) (0.000)
CESEE countries -2.541*** 1.801***
(0.367) (0.341)
Other countries -1.181*** 0.203 0.634*** 0.000
(0.285) (0.415) (0.032) (0.000)
Observations 107 77 30 107 77 30
R-squared 0.975 0.834 1.000 0.994 0.999 0.997
Random effect maximum
likelihood (REML)
Weighted least squares (WLS)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: *(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. Robust standard errors clustered by study in brackets. Sample based on
the set of estimates which are presented as preferred estimates or baseline estimates in the respective papers.
Table 9. Metaregression Estimates: Foreign Currency Deposits
Interest rate differential
independent variable
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As regards the impact of further control variables, we found variables related to 
methodology to predominantly have significant effects. As there is a general agreement 
among authors that estimation methods should address the endogeneity problem, our meta-
analysis shows that the coefficients from studies that treated endogeneity are often 
associated with weaker general results, which also holds true for estimations based on micro 
(survey)-level data. In contrast, estimations with fixed effects broadly do not make a difference 
for the coefficients of the respective determinant. 
Meta-analyses usually test for publication selection bias, which occurs when the 
published literature is systematically unrepresentative of the sample of available studies as 
authors follow their preferences for statistically significant and theoretically sound results 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). To test the potential presence of a publication selection 
bias, we constructed a funnel diagram, which is a scatter diagram with the horizontal scale 
measuring the effect size and the vertical scale measuring the standard error (or precision). In 
the absence of publication selection bias, a plot of effects against their errors should be 
symmetric around the weighted mean. Furthermore, we performed Egger’s test, which is a 
linear test for asymmetry, performing a linear regression of the intervention effect estimates on 
their standard errors, while using the inverse variance as weights. Again, in the absence of 
publication selection bias, the estimated size of the coefficient should not be correlated with 
its standard error, i.e. the null hypothesis should be rejected (Egger et al., 1997). Both the 
funnel plot analysis and Egger’s test (results are available from the authors upon request) 
reject the presence of a publication selection bias for all variables with the exception of 
inflation and inflation volatility being caused by few outliers in the two determinants. Moreover, 
these biases are shown to be relatively small. According to Havranek and Irsova (2011) and 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2008) the asymmetry is important if the coefficients of the 
publication bias are statistically significant and larger than one in absolute value. As this is not 
the case for these two determinants, we do not discuss the publication selection bias further 
in this paper. 
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Our meta-analysis shows that different dollarization drivers have been at work to different 
extents in Latin America and CESEE. A common pattern is that macroeconomic instability (as 
expressed by inflation volatility) and banks’ funding in foreign currency are key drivers of loan 
dollarization. In CESEE, the latter result may reflect the major role of foreign-owned banks in 
the region’s domestic banking system, i.e. of institutions with easy access to wholesale and 
parent bank funding in foreign currency. In Latin American countries, meanwhile, foreign 
banks, which are also dominant in some countries like Mexico, were established as 
subsidiaries rather than branches, and as such rely more on traditional funding (deposits) than 
on wholesale funding. 
Regarding differences, the interest rate differential plays a significant and increasingly 
positive role for foreign currency lending only in Latin America, following achievement of 
macro stability. In contrast, and in line with other studies (i.e. Crespo Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and 
Hake, 2011), interest rate differentials do not influence the currency selection of loans in 
CESEE. From this perspective, borrowers take an excessive risk when taking out foreign 
currency loans, underestimating the danger of exchange rate depreciation. 
Furthermore, exchange rate depreciation and exchange rate volatility exert a negative 
impact on foreign currency loans in Latin America, pointing to a mostly demand-driven effect 
(i.e. lower volatility induces households and firms to take more foreign currency loans). In 
CESEE, however, the exchange rate movements do not play a clear-cut role. On the one 
hand, exchange rate depreciation does not robustly influence foreign currency loans. On the 
other hand and contrary to the results for Latin America, exchange rate volatility induces more 
lending in foreign currency, implying thus predominant supply-driven effects, with banks 
shifting the exchange rate risk to borrowers. 
These findings and in particular the differences between the two regions should be 
taken into account for designing effective policies for reducing dollarization. Generally, 
when promoting sound monetary and fiscal policies to gain macroeconomic stability, 
dedollarization usually emerges as an endogenous outcome (Galindo and Leiderman, 
2005). Nevertheless, that process may be too slow20
Policies targeted at promoting macroeconomic stability should be complemented by 
specific dedollarization measures, geared to whether supply- or demand-driving factors are 
prevalent. In particular, in countries where dollarization is mainly driven by demand-side 
factors, policies could try to discourage foreign currency holdings in a market-driven fashion, 
for instance through the development of domestic capital markets in local currency, the 
introduction of a derivative market to hedge against exchange rate risk, or the extensive use 
of financial instruments indexed to inflation. In this sense, as a first step, changing the 
 and not always successful. For 
instance, anecdotal evidence for some countries suggests that macroeconomic 
stabilization might reduce money supply and deposit dollarization, but at the same time 
induce an increase in liabilities dollarization if, for example, a country reaches higher ratings 
and corporates find it cheaper to fund themselves in foreign currency on international 
markets than in local currency via domestic banks. 
                                                                            
20. For example, Peru has slashed to half the share of foreign currency deposits, but this process lasted ten years, from 
2003 to 2013, while hyperinflation periods ended in 1993. 
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composition of public sector debt toward indexed instruments may induce inertia in the 
behavior of the private sector and facilitate the introduction of domestic nominal nonindexed 
instruments once price stability is on track. As a case in point, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and 
Bolivia have pursued such policies, with some very positive results, whereas Peru focused on 
developing nominal bonds, with promising results. In contrast, if dollarization is considered to 
be predominantly driven by supply factors, other complementary measures focused on 
prudential rules, such as banking sector regulation to impose a ceiling on the net foreign 
currency positions of commercial banks, could be taken into account. Moreover, imposing 
special reserve requirements on foreign currency assets and liabilities may curb the expansion 
of foreign currency loans and, consequently, of currency mismatches in the nonfinancial 
private sector. Brazil and Peru are maybe the most prominent examples of public sector-
induced dedollarization and the intensive use of reserve requirements to dedollarize the 
economy. In the extreme, past experience has proven that the “de jure” prohibitions to hold 
liabilities or assets in foreign currency may be successful (e.g. Brazil and Colombia). Yet at the 
other extreme, the Argentinean experience (of forced convertibility to domestic currency) in 
the early 2000s has also shown that those policies are flawed with risks, in particular if a 
country has not been able to consolidate a credible policy framework. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1406 
REFERENCES 
ALBEROLA, E., L. MOLINA and D. NAVIA (2005). Say you fix, enjoy and relax: the deleterious effects of peg 
announcements on fiscal discipline. In: International Finance 0509001. 
ARTETA, C. O. (2002). Exchange rate regimes and financial dollarization: does flexibility reduce bank currency 
mismatches? International Finance Discussion Papers 738. 
BARAJAS, A., and A. R. MORALES (2003). Dollarization of liabilities: Beyond the usual suspects. IMF Working Paper 11. 
BASSO, H. S., O. CALVO-GONZALES and M. JURGILAS (2007). Financial dollarization: the role of banks and interest 
rates. ECB Working Paper 748. 
— (2011). Financial dollarization: The role of foreign-owned banks and interest rates. In: Journal of Banking & Finance 
35(4). 794–806. 
BECKMANN, E., T. SCHEIBER and H. STIX (2011). How the Crisis Affected Foreign Currency Borrowing in CESEE: 
Microeconomic evidence and policy implications”, Focus on European Economic Integration Q1/11. 25–43. 
BECKMANN, E., J. FIDRMUC and H. STIX (2012). Foreign Currency Loans and Loan Arrears of Households in Central 
and Eastern Europe. OeNB Working Paper 181.  
BROWN, M., S. ONGENA and P. YESIN (2009). Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms. CEPR Discussion Paper 
7952. 
— (2010). Foreign currency borrowing by small firms in the transition economies. In: Journal of Financial Intermediation 
20(3). 285–302. 
BROWN, M., K. KIRSCHENMANN and S. ONGENA (2010). Foreign Currency Loans – Demand or Supply Driven? CEPR 
Discussion Paper 7952. 
BROWN, M., and R. DE HAAS (2010). Foreign currency lending in emerging Europe: bank-level evidence. EBRD 
Working Paper 122. 
— (2012). Foreign currency lending in emerging Europe: bank-level evidence. In: Economic Policy 27(69). 57–98.  
BRZOZA-BRZEZINA, M., T. CHMIELEWSKI and J. NIEDŹWIEDŹINSKA (2010). Substitution between domestic and 
foreign currency loans in Central Europe. Do central banks matter? ECB Working Paper 1187. 
CRESPO CUARESMA, J., J. FIDRMUC and M. HAKE (2011). Determinants of Foreign Currency Loans in CESEE 
Countries: A Meta-Analysis. In: Focus on European Economic Integration Q4/11. 69–87. 
CRESPO CUARESMA, J., J. FIDRMUC and M. HAKE (2013). Demand and supply drivers of foreign currency loans in 
CEECs: A meta-analysis. In: Economic Systems. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2013.09.001. 
CSAJBÓK, A., A. HUDECZ and B. TAMÁSI (2010). Foreign currency borrowing of households in the new EU member 
states. MNB Working Paper 87.  
DOUCOULIAGOS, H., and T. STANLEY (2008). Theory Competition and Selectivity: Are All Economic Facts Greatly 
Exaggerated? Deakin University Economic Series Working Paper 06. 
EBRD (2010). Developing Local Currency Finance. Transition Report 2010 (Chapter 3). 46–65. 
EGGER, M., G. D. SMITH, M. SCHEIDER and C. MINDER (1997). Bias in meta-analysis detected by a simple, graphical 
test. In: British Medical Journal 315. 629–634. 
ESQUIVEL-MONGE, M. (2007). Hysteresis in dollarization evidence from the Costa Rican economy. Banco Central de 
Costa Rica Working Paper. 
FIDRMUC, J., M. HAKE and H. STIX (2011). Households’ Foreign Currency Borrowing in Central and Eastern Europe. 
OeNB Working Paper 171. 
FIDRMUC, J., M. HAKE and H. STIX (2013). Households’ foreign currency borrowing in Central and Eastern Europe. In: 
Journal of Banking & Finance 37(6). 1880–1897. 
GALIANI, S., E. LEVY YEYATI and E. SCHARGRODKY (2003). Financial dollarization and debt deflation under a currency 
board. In: Emerging Markets Review 4(4). 340–347. 
GALINDO, A., and L. LEIDERMAN (2005). Living with dollarization and the route to dedollarization. IDB Working Paper 
526. 
GALLEGO, S., S. GARDÓ, R. MARTIN, L. MOLINA and J. M. SERENA (2010). The impact of the global economic and 
financial crisis on Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe (CESEE) and Latina America. Banco de España 
Occasional Paper 1002. 
GARCIA-ESCRIBANO, M. (2010). Peru: Drivers of de-dollarization. IMF Working Paper 169. 
GARCIA-ESCRIBANO, M., and S. SOSA (2011). What is driving financial de-dollarization in Latin Amerika. IMF Working 
Paper 10. 
HAISS, P., and W. RAINER (2012). Credit euroization in CESEE: The “Foreign Funds” channel at work. In: Comparative 
Economic Studies 54(3). 471–505. 
HAVRANEK, T., and Z. IRSOVA (2011). Determinants of Horizontal Spillovers from FDI. Evidence from a Large Meta-
Analysis. CNB Working Paper 7/2011. 
HONIG, A. (2009). Dollarization, exchange rate regimes and government quality? In: Journal of Money and Finance 28(2). 
198–214. 
KAMIL, H., and K. RAI (2010). The global credit crunch and foreign banks’ lending to emerging markets: Why did Latin 
America fare better? IMF Working Paper 10/102. 
KAMIN, S., and N. ERICSSON (1993). Dollarization in Argentina. International Finance Discussion Paper 460. 
KNELL, M. and H. STIX (2005). The Income Elasticity of Money Demand: A Meta Analysis of Empirical Results. In: 
Journal of Economic Surveys 19(3). 513–533. 
KRUEGER, A. B. (2003). Economic Considerations and Class Size. In: The Economic Journal 113(485). F34–F63. 
LANE, P., and J. C. SHAMBAUGH (2009). The long or short of it: determinants of foreign currency exposure in external 
balance sheets. NBER Working Paper 14909. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1406 
LUCA, A., and I. PETROVA (2008). What drives credit dollarization in transition economies? In: Journal of Banking & 
Finance 32(5). 858–869. 
MELVIN, M., and J. LADMAN (1991). Coca dollars and the dollarization of South America. In: Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking 23(4). 752–763. 
MORA, N. (2012). The bank lending channel in a partially dollarized economy. In: Journal of Applied Economics 16(1). 
121–151. 
NEANIDIS, K. C., and C. S. SAVVA (2009). Financial Dollarization: Short-Run Determinants in Transition Economies. In: 
Journal of Banking and Finance 33(10). 1860–1873. 
NEANIDIS, K. C. (2010). Financial dollarization and European Union Membership. In: International Finance 13(2). 257–
282. 
PEIERS, B., and J. M. WRASE (1997). Dollarization hysteresis and network externalities: Theory and evidence from an 
informal Bolivian credit market. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 97/21. 
REINHART, C. and K. ROGOFF (2009). This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton University 
Press. 
ROSENBERG, C., and M. TIRPAK (2008). Determinants of foreign currency borrowing in the new member states of the 
EU. IMF Working Paper 173. 
— (2009). Determinants of foreign currency borrowing in the new member states of the EU. In: Czech Journal of 
Economics and Finance 59(3). 216–228. 
STANLEY, T. D., and S. B. JARRELL (1989). Meta-Regression Analysis: a Quantitative Method of Literature Review. In: 
Journal of Economic Surveys 3(2). 161–170. 
STANLEY, T. D., and H. DOUCOULIAGOS (2012). Meta-Regression Analysis in Economics and Business. London and 
New York: Routeledge. 
STEINER, K. (2009). Supply of and demand for foreign currency loans to households in CEE-11. Dissertation. Vienna 
University of Economics and Business. 
— (2011). Households’ Exposure to Foreign Currency Loans in CESEE EU Member States and Croatia. In: Focus on 
European Economic Integration Q1/11. 6–24. 
THOMPSON, S. G., and S. J. SHARP (1999). Explaining heterogeneity in meta-analysis: A comparison of methods. In: 
Statistics in Medicine 18(20): 2693–2708. 
UZIN, A. (2005). Financial dollarization, monetary policy stance and institutional structure: The experience of Latin 
America and Turkey. Master thesis submitted to the Middle East Technical University, Turkey. 
ZETTELMEYER, J., P. NAGY and S. JEFFREY (2010). Addressing private sector currency mismatches in emerging 
Europe. EBRD Working Paper 115. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1220  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, LUIS MOLINA and PEDRO DEL RÍO: Boom-bust cycles, imbalances and discipline in Europe.
1221  CARLOS GONZÁLEZ-AGUADO and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Determinants of corporate default: a BMA 
approach.
1222 GALO NUÑO and CARLOS THOMAS: Bank leverage cycles.
1223 YUNUS AKSOY and HENRIQUE S. BASSO: Liquidity, term spreads and monetary policy.
1224  FRANCISCO DE CASTRO and DANIEL GARROTE: The effects of fi scal shocks on the exchange rate in the EMU and 
differences with the US.
1225  STÉPHANE BONHOMME and LAURA HOSPIDO: The cycle of earnings inequality: evidence from Spanish social  
security data.
1226 CARMEN BROTO: The effectiveness of forex interventions in four Latin American countries.
1227 LORENZO RICCI and DAVID VEREDAS: TailCoR.
1228  YVES DOMINICY, SIEGFRIED HÖRMANN, HIROAKI OGATA and DAVID VEREDAS: Marginal quantiles for stationary  
processes.
1229  MATTEO BARIGOZZI, ROXANA HALBLEIB and DAVID VEREDAS: Which model to match?
1230 MATTEO LUCIANI and DAVID VEREDAS: A model for vast panels of volatilities.
1231 AITOR ERCE: Does the IMF’s offi cial support affect sovereign bond maturities?
1232 JAVIER MENCÍA and ENRIQUE SENTANA: Valuation of VIX derivatives.
1233 ROSSANA MEROLA and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Fiscal forecast errors: governments vs independent agencies?
1234  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Why do Spanish fi rms rarely use the bankruptcy 
system? The role of the mortgage institution.
1235  MAXIMO CAMACHO, YULIYA LOVCHA and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Can we use seasonally adjusted indicators 
in dynamic factor models?
1236  JENS HAGENDORFF, MARÍA J. NIETO and LARRY D. WALL: The safety and soundness effects of bank M&As in the EU: 
Does prudential regulation have any impact?
1237  SOFÍA GALÁN and SERGIO PUENTE: Minimum wages: do they really hurt young people?
1238  CRISTIANO CANTORE, FILIPPO FERRONI and MIGUEL A. LEÓN-LEDESMA: The dynamics of hours worked and  
technology.
1239  ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER, SONIA RUANO and VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: Why did high productivity growth of banks 
precede the fi nancial crisis?
1240  MARIA DOLORES GADEA RIVAS and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: The failure to predict the Great Recession. The failure 
of academic economics? A view focusing on the role of credit.
1241  MATTEO CICCARELLI, EVA ORTEGA and MARIA TERESA VALDERRAMA: Heterogeneity and cross-country spillovers in 
macroeconomic-fi nancial linkages.
1242  GIANCARLO CORSETTI, LUCA DEDOLA and FRANCESCA VIANI: Traded and nontraded goods prices, and 
international risk sharing: an empirical investigation.
1243 ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Growth empirics in panel data under model uncertainty and weak exogeneity.
1301 JAMES COSTAIN and ANTON NAKOV: Logit price dynamics.
1302 MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA: Insolvency institutions and effi ciency: the Spanish case.
1303  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Firm size and judicial effi cacy: evidence for the new 
civil procedures in Spain.
1304  MAXIMO CAMACHO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Commodity prices and the business cycle in Latin America: living 
and dying by commodities?
1305  CARLOS PÉREZ MONTES: Estimation of regulatory credit risk models.
1306  FERNANDO LÓPEZ VICENTE: The effect of foreclosure regulation: evidence for the US mortgage market at state level.
1307 ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and LUIS SERVEN: Testing weak exogeneity in cointegrated panels.
1308  EMMA BERENGUER, RICARDO GIMENO and JUAN M. NAVE: Term structure estimation, liquidity-induced 
heteroskedasticity and the price of liquidity risk.
1309  PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Fiscal multipliers in turbulent times: the case of Spain.
1310 SAMUEL HURTADO: DSGE models and the Lucas critique.
1311 HENRIQUE S. BASSO and JAMES COSTAIN: Fiscal delegation in a monetary union with decentralized public spending.
1312 MAITE BLÁZQUEZ CUESTA and SANTIAGO BUDRÍA: Does income deprivation affect people’s mental well-being?
1313  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Growth beyond imbalances. Sustainable 
growth rates and output gap reassessment.
1314  CARMEN BROTO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Disentangling contagion among sovereign CDS spreads during the 
European debt crisis.
1315  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? A study of small 
business distress in Spain.
1316  ROBERTO RAMOS and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Agglomeration matters for trade.
1317  LAURA HOSPIDO and GEMA ZAMARRO: Retirement patterns of couples in Europe.
1318  MAXIMO CAMACHO, GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS and PILAR PONCELA: Short-term forecasting for empirical 
economists. A survey of the recently proposed algorithms.
1319  CARLOS PÉREZ MONTES: The impact of interbank and public debt markets on the competition for bank deposits.
1320  OLYMPIA BOVER, JOSE MARIA CASADO, SONIA COSTA, PHILIP DU CAJU, YVONNE MCCARTHY, 
EVA SIERMINSKA, PANAGIOTA TZAMOURANI, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA and TIBOR ZAVADIL: The distribution 
of debt across euro area countries: the role of Individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions.
1321  BRINDUSA ANGHEL, SARA DE LA RICA and AITOR LACUESTA: Employment polarisation in Spain over the course of 
the 1997-2012 cycle.
1322  RODOLFO G. CAMPOS and ILIANA REGGIO: Measurement error in imputation procedures.
1323  PABLO BURRIEL and MARÍA ISABEL GARCÍA-BELMONTE: Meeting our D€STINY. A Disaggregated €uro area Short 
Term Indicator model to forecast GDP (Y) growth.
1401  TERESA SASTRE and FRANCESCA VIANI: Countries’ safety and competitiveness, and the estimation of current 
account misalignments.
1402  FERNANDO BRONER, ALBERTO MARTIN, AITOR ERCE and JAUME VENTURA: Sovereign debt markets in turbulent 
times: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects.
1403  JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ROCÍO PRIETO: The structure of sub-national public debt: liquidity vs credit risks.
1404  BING XU, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL and MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN: Measuring bank competition in China: 
a comparison of new versus conventional approaches applied to loan markets.
1405  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Entrepreneurship and enforcement institutions: 
disaggregated evidence for Spain.
1406  MARIYA HAKE, FERNANDO LÓPEZ-VICENTE and LUIS MOLINA: Do the drivers of loan dollarisation differ between 
CESEE and Latin America? A meta-analysis.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
